jan 1, 1933 - "I shall show how nineteen out of President
Wilson's twenty-three Terms of Peace ' were
flagrantly violated in the Treaty of Versailles as
finally drafted. "
Peacemaking 1919 by Harold Nicolson
pg. 13-16
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In my next chapter I shall describe my own veneration for the Fourteen Points ; I shall summarise those points and their attendant principles ; and I shall show how nineteen out of President Wilson's twenty-three Terms of Peace ' were flagrantly violated in the Treaty of Versailles as finally drafted.
For the moment I am concerned only with the pre-armistice agreement under which Germany consented to surrender on the explicit understanding that the peace terms thereafter to be imposed upon her would conform absolutely to Wilsonian principles, and would in fact be merely' the practical detail of application' of those twenty-three conditions on which alone she had consented to lay down her arms. I have summarized above the exchange of correspondence in which this agreement was embodied. Yet this is not the whole story. Sufficient importance has not, except by Mr. Winston Churchill, been given to Colonel House's 'Interpretation' of the Fourteen Points which preceded their acceptance by the Associated Powers. Colonel House, at the time, was the Representative of America upon the Supreme War Council at Versailles. It was that body which approved the Armistice Terms as drafted, and through which the Allied Powers accepted President Wilson's 'Terms of Peace.' Colonel House's' Interpretation or commentary of or on the Fourteen Points is thus a document of very vital importance. This 'commentary' was, on October 29, 1918, cabled to President Wilson for his approval. It contained the following glosses upon the Fourteen Points and the New Principles. The expression 'open covenants 'was not to be interpreted as precluding confidential diplomatic negotiation. By the Freedom of the Seas the President had not intended to abolish the weapon of blockade, but merely to inculcate some respect for private rights and property. The President himself advanced the engaging theory that in future wars, because of the League of Nations, there ' would be no neutrals.' Under this double gloss, paragraph 2. of the Fourteen Points became the vaguest expression of opinion. The demand for free trade among the nations of the earth was not to be interpreted as precluding all protection of home industries. Far from it. All that it entailed was the ' open door' for raw material, and the prohibition of discriminatory tariffs between members of the League of Nations. The point regarding ' disarmament ' implied only that the Powers should accept the theory in principle, and should agree to the appointment of a Commission to examine the details. The German Colonies might, when the time came, be in principle regarded as the property of the League of Nations, and thus be farmed out among desirable mandatories. Belgium was to be indemnified for all war-costs since every expense to which that unfortunate country had been exposed since August of 1914 was an' illegitimate' expense. France on the other hand, was not to receive full war costs, only a full indemnity for the actual damage done. Her claim to the territory of the Saar was ' a clear violation of the President's proposal.' Italy, for reasons of security, might claim the Brenner frontier, but the German populations which would thus be incorporated within the Italian frontier should be assured complete autonomy. The subject races of Austria-Hungary should have complete independence conditional upon a guarantee for the protection of racial and linguistic minorities. The mere offer of autonomy 'no longer held.' Bulgaria, on the other hand (a country with whom the United States were not at war, and on whom they had in the past conferred great educational and philanthropic benefits) was to be compensated for having entered the war against us. She was to be given not only the Dobrudja and Western Thrace, but Eastern Thrace as well, as far even as the Midia-Rodosto
line. Constantinople and the Straits were to be placed under international control. Central Asia Minor was to remain Turkish. Great Britain was to obtain Palestine, Arabia and Iraq. The Greeks might possibly be accorded a mandate over Smyrna and the adjacent districts. Armenia was to be created as an independent State under the tutelage of some great Power. Poland must have access to the sea, although such access implied a difficulty. That difficulty was the severance of East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Colonel House was careful to warn the President that this solution would not be an easy solution. And finally the League of Nations was to be the ' foundation of the diplomatic structure of a permanent peace.' I do not wish to imply that Colonel House, in presenting this, his interpretation to the Associated Powers, was guilty of any desire to modify the fourteen commandments. I have the most profound respect for Colonel House-considering him to be the best diplomatic brain that America has yet produced, yet I confess that a most undesirable obscurity hangs over his 'interpretation.' Was it on the basis of that interpretation that the Allies accepted the Fourteen Points, the Four Principles and the Five Particulars, as the basis of the eventual Treaty of Peace ? If so, then the enemy Powers should assuredly have been in formed at the time. I write subject to correction, since
the exact documents, the exact exchange of suggestion and agreement, are not to-day available. Yet it is difficult to resist the impression that the Enemy Powers accepted the Fourteen Points as they stood ; whereas the Allied Powers accepted them only as interpreted by Colonel House at the meetings which culminated in his cable of October 2.9. Somewhere, amid the
hurried and anxious imprecisions of those October days, lurks the explanation of the fundamental misunderstanding which has since arisen.
In any case we, the technical staff, the civil servants, had no knowledge of Colonel House's Interpretation.' We also looked upon the Fourteen Points and their attendant pronouncements as the charter for our future activity. As I shall show, a great gap widened between our terms of reference, and the eventual conclusions. Had we known of Colonel House's glossary, we might, in April, have seized upon it as a justification for our backsliding. Yet it was not until many years later that l even heard of this glossary. And I cannot, for one moment, pretend that it influenced my attitude to the slightest degree. I betrayed my own allegiance to the Fourteen Points. The purpose of this book is to give some indication, some slight clue, as to the reasons for, or rather the atmosphere of, that betrayal.
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