15 lugl 2024 anni - BREAKING: Biden DOJ's classified docs case against Trump DISMISSED after judge deems Jack Smith appointment unconstitutional The Post Millennial 2020 July, 13

Descrizione:

"Former President Trump’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment Based on the Unlawful Appointment and Funding of Special Counsel Jack Smith is Granted in accordance with this order."

On Monday morning, Judge Aileen Cannon dismissed the Mar-a-Lago documents case against Trump, stating in an order that special counsel Jack Smith’s appointment as special counsel violated the Constitution.

"Former President Trump's Motion to Dismiss Indictment Based on the Unlawful Appointment and Funding of Special Counsel Jack Smith is GRANTED in accordance with this Order [ECF No. 326]. The Superseding Indictment is DISMISSED because Special Counsel Smith's appointment violates the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution," the 93-page Monday morning order stated. "US Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Special Counsel Smith's use of a permanent indefinite appropriation also violates the Appropriations Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 7, but the Court need not address the proper remedy for that funding violation given the dismissal on Appointments Clause grounds."

Cannon wrote that the challenges raised in the motion to dismiss asked whether there was a "statute in the United States Code that authorizes the appointment of Special Counsel Smith to conduct this prosecution."

"After careful study of this seminal issue, the answer is no. None of the statutes cited as legal authority for the appointment— 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515, 533—gives the Attorney General broad inferior-officer appointing power or bestows upon him the right to appoint a federal officer with the kind of prosecutorial power wielded by Special Counsel Smith. Nor do the Special Counsel’s strained statutory arguments, appeals to inconsistent history, or reliance on out-of-circuit authority persuade otherwise."

Cannon wrote that "The Appointments Clause is a critical constitutional restriction stemming from the separation of powers, and it gives to Congress a considered role in determining the propriety of vesting appointment power for inferior officers," but the position of special counsel "effectively usurps that important legislative authority, transferring it to a Head of Department, and in the process threatening the structural liberty inherent in the separation of powers."

"If the political branches wish to grant the Attorney General power to appoint Special Counsel Smith to investigate and prosecute this action with the full powers of a United States Attorney, there is a valid means by which to do so. He can be appointed and confirmed through the default method prescribed in the Appointments Clause, as Congress has directed for United States Attorneys throughout American history, or Congress can authorize his appointment through enactment of positive statutory law consistent with the Appointments Clause."

Cannon later added, "The Framers gave Congress a pivotal role in the appointment of principal and inferior officers. That role cannot be usurped by the Executive Branch or diffused elsewhere—whether in this case or in another case, whether in times of heightened national need or not. In the case of inferior officers, that means that Congress is empowered to decide if it wishes to vest appointment power in a Head of Department, and indeed, Congress has proven itself quite capable of doing so in many other statutory contexts."

"But it plainly did not do so here, despite the Special Counsel’s strained statutory readings. Nor does his appeal to inconsistent “historical practice” supplant the absence of textual authorization for his appointment. The same structural emphases resonate in the context of the Appropriation Clause, which “embodies a fundamental separation of powers principle—subjugating the executive branch to the legislatures power of the purse."

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