1 magg 2017 anni - Annual Review of Political Science: The Electoral Consequences of Corruption

Descrizione:

A core assumption ... is that voters punish corrupt politicians if they have the opportunity to do so. Yet, the empirical evidence on the electoral punishment of corruption is mixed. Although a fair amount of evidence suggests that corrupt activities indeed take a considerable electoral toll on incumbents, we often observe empirical deviations from the widespread assumption that voters punish politicians who steal from them. The reelection of corrupt politicians is not merely a trait of developing nations characterized by weak political and economic institutions but is also found in established democracies such as Italy, Japan, and the United States.

This raises the question of why voters often fail to punish politicians for corrupt activities. Research has provided a variety of answers to this question. At the individual level, authors have pointed toward the effects of informational asymmetries, the importance of partisan and other in-group loyalties, or side payments. At the contextual level, researchers suggest that the presence of strong economic growth or a lack of institutional clarity might weaken the electoral punishment of politicians who are known to be corrupt.

Vol. 20:391-408 (Volume publication date May 2017)
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052715-111917

Catherine E. De Vries and Hector Solaz

Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom; email: catherine.devries@essex.ac.uk; hector.solaz@essex.ac.uk

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