1 jan 1898 ano - War between U.S. and Spain

Descrição:

teller ammendment: An amendment to the 1898 U.S. declaration of war against Spain disclaiming any intention by the United States to occupy Cuba.

Events in the Caribbean presented the United States with major opportunities. In 1895, Cuban patriots mounted a major guerrilla war against Spain, which had lost most of its other New World territories but continued to rule Cuba. The Spanish commander responded by rounding up Cuban civilians into concentration camps, where as many as 200,000 died of starvation, exposure, or dysentery. In the United States, “yellow journalists” such as William Randolph Hearst turned their plight into a cause célèbre. Hearst’s coverage of Spanish atrocities fed a surge of American nationalism, especially among those who feared that industrialization was causing men to lose physical strength and valor. The government should not pass up this opportunity, said Indiana senator Albert Beveridge, to “manufacture manhood.” Congress called for Cuban independence.

President Cleveland had no interest in supporting the Cuban rebellion, and many of his Democratic supporters were leery of expansions of federal military power. Cleveland worried over Spain’s failure to end the conflict, however, since the war disrupted trade and damaged American-owned sugar plantations on the island. Moreover, an unstable Cuba was incompatible with U.S. strategic interests, including a proposed canal whose Caribbean approaches had to be safeguarded. Flush with victory in 1897, new Republican President William McKinley took a more aggressive stance than his predecessor. In September, a U.S. diplomat informed Spain that it must ensure an “early and certain peace” or the United States would step in. At first, this hard line seemed to work: Spain’s conservative regime fell, and a liberal Spanish government, taking office in October 1897, offered Cuba limited self-rule. But Spanish loyalists in Havana rioted against the proposal, while Cuban rebels held out for full independence.

In February 1898, Hearst’s New York Journal published a private letter in which a Spanish minister to the United States belittled McKinley. The minister, Dupuy de Lôme, resigned, but exposure of the de Lôme letter intensified Americans’ indignation toward Spain. The next week brought shocking news: the U.S. battle cruiser Maine had exploded and sunk in Havana harbor, with 260 seamen lost. “Whole Country Thrills with the War Fever,” proclaimed the New York Journal. “Remember the Maine” became a national chant. Popular passions now added pressure in the march toward war.

McKinley assumed the sinking of the Maine had been accidental. Improbably, though, a naval board of inquiry blamed an underwater mine, fueling public outrage. (Later investigators disagreed: the more likely cause was a faulty ship design that placed explosive munitions too close to coal bunkers, which were prone to fire.) No evidence linked Spain to the purported mine, but if something in Havana harbor sank the Maine, then Spain was responsible for not protecting the ship.

Business leaders became impatient, believing war was preferable to an unending Cuban crisis. On March 27, McKinley cabled an ultimatum to Madrid: an immediate ceasefire in Cuba for six months and, with the United States mediating, peace negotiations with the rebels. Spain, while desperate to avoid war, balked at the United States’s additional demand that mediation must result in Cuban independence. On April 11, McKinley asked Congress for authority to intervene in Cuba “in the name of civilization, [and] in behalf of endangered American interests.”

Historians long referred to the ensuing fight as the Spanish-American War, but because that name ignores the pivotal role of Cuban revolutionaries, many historians now call the three-way conflict the War of 1898. Though McKinley had already demanded Cuban independence and Americans widely admired Cubans’ aspirations for freedom, the McKinley administration defeated a congressional attempt to recognize the rebel government. In response, Senator Henry M. Teller of Colorado added an amendment to the war bill disclaiming any intention by the United States to occupy Cuba. The Teller Amendment reassured Americans that their country would respect the political independence of other nations. McKinley’s expectations differed. He wrote privately, “We must keep all we get; when the war is over we must keep what we want.”

On April 24, 1898, Spain declared war on the United States. The news provoked full-blown war fever. Across the country, young men enlisted for the fight. Theodore Roosevelt, serving in the War Department, resigned to become lieutenant colonel of a cavalry regiment. The sudden mobilization was chaotic. Recruits poured into makeshift bases around Tampa, Florida, where confusion reigned. Rifles failed to arrive; food was bad and sanitation worse. No provision had been made for getting troops to Cuba, so the government hastily collected a fleet of yachts and commercial boats. Fortunately, the regular U.S. Army was a disciplined, professional force; its 28,000 seasoned troops provided a nucleus for 200,000 volunteers. The navy was in far better shape: Spain had nothing to match America’s seven modern battleships and armored cruisers. The Spanish admiral predicted, sadly and accurately, that his fleet would “like Don Quixote go out to fight windmills and come back with a broken head.”

An important measure of U.S. intentions was the fact that the first, decisive military engagement took place in the Pacific — not Cuba. This was the handiwork of Theodore Roosevelt, who, in his government post, had gotten intrepid Commodore George Dewey appointed commander of the Pacific fleet. In the event of war, Dewey had instructions to sail immediately for the Spanish-owned Philippines. When war was declared, Roosevelt confronted his surprised superior and pressured him into validating Dewey’s instructions. On May 1, 1898, American ships cornered the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay and destroyed it. Manila, the Philippine capital, fell on August 13. “We must on no account let the [Philippines] go,” declared Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. McKinley agreed. The United States now had something Republican policymakers since William Seward had wanted: a major foothold in the western Pacific.

In Cuba, Spanish forces were depleted by the long guerrilla war against Cuba’s homegrown revolutionaries. American forces, though poorly trained and equipped, had the advantages of a demoralized foe and knowledgeable Cuban allies. The main battle occurred on July 1 at San Juan Hill, near Santiago, where the Spanish fleet was anchored. Roosevelt’s Rough Riders took the lead, but four African American regiments bore the brunt of the fighting. Observers credited much of the victory to the “superb gallantry” of these soldiers. Spanish troops retreated to a well-fortified second line, but U.S. forces were spared the test of a second assault. On July 3, the Spanish fleet in Santiago harbor tried a desperate run through the American blockade and was destroyed. Days later, Spanish forces surrendered. American combat casualties had been few; most U.S. soldiers’ deaths had resulted from malaria and yellow fever.

The United States and Spain quickly signed a preliminary peace agreement in which Spain agreed to liberate Cuba and cede Puerto Rico and Guam to the United States. What would happen to the Philippines, an immense archipelago that lay more than 5,000 miles from California? Initially, the United States aimed to keep only Manila, because of its fine harbor. Manila was not defensible, however, without the whole island of Luzon, on which it sat. After deliberating, McKinley found a justification for annexing all of the Philippines. He decided that “we could not leave [the Filipinos] to themselves — they were unfit for self-rule.”

This declaration provoked heated debate. Under the Constitution, as Republican senator George F. Hoar argued, “no power is given to the Federal Government to acquire territory to be held and governed permanently as colonies” or “to conquer alien people and hold them in subjugation.” Leading citizens and peace advocates, including Jane Addams and Mark Twain, enlisted in the anti-imperialist cause. Anti-imperialists were a diverse lot. Steel magnate Andrew Carnegie offered $20 million to purchase Philippine independence and set the islands free. Labor leader Samuel Gompers — a fierce foe of Carnegie’s labor policies — nonetheless agreed with him about the Philippines, warning union members about the threat of competition from low-wage Filipino immigrants. Some anti-imperialists were also antiracists, arguing that Filipinos were perfectly capable of self-rule. Other critics of McKinley’s policies warned about the dangers of annexing eight million Filipinos of an “inferior race.” “No matter whether they are fit to govern themselves or not,” declared a Missouri congressman, “they are not fit to govern us.”

Beginning in late 1898, anti-imperialist leagues sprang up around the country, but they never sparked a mass movement. On the contrary, McKinley’s “splendid little war” proved immensely popular. Confronted with that reality, Democrats waffled. Their standard-bearer, William Jennings Bryan, decided not to stake Democrats’ future on opposition to a policy that he believed to be irreversible. He threw his party into turmoil by declaring last-minute support for McKinley’s proposed treaty. Having met military defeat, Spanish representatives had little choice. In the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States for $20 million.

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