26 juill. 1956 - Nationalisation of the Suez Canal

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On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal during a speech in Alexandria. By pronouncing the name of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the builder of the canal, as a code word, Egyptian forces seized control of the canal. Nasser declared that all assets of the Suez Canal Company were frozen, and shareholders would be compensated based on the Paris Stock Exchange's closing price. On the same day, Egypt closed the canal to Israeli shipping, blocked the Gulf of Aqaba, and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli vessels, violating the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and arguably the 1949 Armistice Agreements.

British Response
The nationalization surprised Britain, threatening its economic and military interests. Prime Minister Anthony Eden faced pressure from Conservative MPs to take decisive action. Eden, hosting a dinner for Iraqi leaders, received their unequivocal advice to act swiftly and forcefully against Nasser, a sentiment shared by many in Britain. Initially supported by Labour Party leader Hugh Gaitskell, who later expressed caution about unilateral military action without UN support, the British government decided on military intervention to prevent the collapse of British prestige.

French Response
French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, outraged by Nasser's actions, was determined to prevent Nasser from succeeding. French public opinion supported Mollet, and he viewed Nasser's book, The Philosophy of the Revolution, as a call to arms. On July 29, 1956, the French Cabinet decided on military action against Egypt, seeking British cooperation. Mollet was frustrated with the Eisenhower administration's lack of support and, feeling betrayed, was even more resolved to act independently if necessary.

Commonwealth Response
Responses within the British Commonwealth varied:

Australia and New Zealand: Supported Britain due to historical ties to the canal, with leaders Robert Menzies and Sidney Holland indicating potential military support.
Canada: Had minimal ties to the canal and remained neutral.
South Africa: Preferred to stay out of the conflict, seeing potential economic and geopolitical benefits from a closed canal.
India and Ceylon: Viewed Egypt's actions as anti-imperialist but remained cautious in their public support.
Pakistan: Sympathized with Egypt's anti-Western stance but ultimately sided with Western allies.
Western Diplomacy
On August 1, 1956, a tripartite meeting between British, American, and French officials took place in London. Eisenhower suggested a conference of maritime nations using the canal, which led to a meeting in London from August 16-23, 1956. The conference saw 18 of 22 nations support international operation of the canal, while India, Indonesia, and the Soviet Union backed Egypt's position.

Menzies led a delegation to Cairo, presenting proposals for international control, which Nasser rejected. The U.S. then proposed an association of canal users, which Britain believed could lead to military action if violated. However, American Secretary of State Dulles opposed force, emphasizing diplomacy.

Eisenhower warned Eden against military action, stating that American public opinion would not support it. Misreading U.S. intentions, British Chancellor Harold Macmillan inaccurately assured Eden of American tacit support, leading to the crucial miscalculation that the U.S. would accept Anglo-French actions if presented as a fait accompli.

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